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RESOLVING A “SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION”: JUST WHO IS
ENTITLED TO BAIL PENDING APPEAL UNDER THE BAIL
REFORM ACT OF 1984?
Doug Keller*
Abstract
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, federal criminal defendants who
wish to remain free on bail after conviction must prove that their appeal
will have enough merit to raise at least one “substantial question.” Federal
appellate courts, however, have been deeply divided over how much merit
is required to show that an appeal will raise a “substantial question.” Ten
circuits define the phrase as a “close question,” based on an implausible
reading of the 1984 Bail Act’s legislative history. But the Ninth Circuit has
interpreted the requirement to mean that a defendant must prove that his
appeal will raise a “fairly debatable” issue—the historical definition of
what constitutes a substantial question. It is therefore much easier to obtain
bail pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit than in circuits using the closequestion test. This Article argues that the Ninth Circuit has it right, and
thus, countless defendants in other circuits have been wrongfully denied
bail pending appeal. At least some of those defendants have had their
convictions overturned on appeal, resulting in the gross injustice of a
wrongful incarceration.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A federal criminal defendant sentenced to prison must typically begin
serving time quickly unless he is allowed to remain free on bail until the
completion of his direct appeal.1 But the question of when a defendant is
entitled to bail pending appeal has divided the circuits ever since Congress
changed the bail standard more than two decades ago. This Article
explores that controversy and concludes that most courts have made it
harder for defendants to obtain bail pending appeal than Congress
intended—an injustice that should be promptly corrected.

1. See, e.g., Lepesh v. United States, No. 99-CR-516-BR, 2006 WL 2381857, at *1 (D. Or.
Aug. 11, 2006) (discussing a defendant who was required to surrender two weeks after he was
sentenced); United States v. Zgleszewski, No. CRIM.A. 02-774, 2004 WL 350187, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 10, 2004) (same).
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There are high stakes involved in deciding who is entitled to bail
pending appeal. A defendant not released on bail is incarcerated before an
appellate court has confirmed that his conviction is legal. An erroneously
convicted defendant who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to
society that he never owed.2 On the other hand, society has a compelling
interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating individuals who are
found guilty beyond any reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to
warrant prison time. Under what circumstances a defendant can obtain bail
pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society
and the defendant.
Congress has struck the current balance in the Bail Reform Act of
1984.3 The Act provides that a defendant is entitled to bail pending appeal
when, among other things, he can prove (1) that he will not be a flight risk
or a danger to the community while out on bail and (2) that his appeal will
be meritorious enough to raise at least one “substantial question.”4 The
circuits unanimously agree that Congress intended to make it more
difficult to obtain bail pending appeal when it passed the 1984 Bail Act.5
But the circuits disagree on how much harder Congress made obtaining
bail when it replaced the previous requirement that the defendant’s appeal
raise a non-frivolous issue with the current requirement that the appeal
raise a substantial question.6
Most courts define a substantial question as a “close question.”7 The
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, defines substantial question more broadly
by using the same definition that the phrase was given in a prior
incarnation of the standard for bail pending appeal—i.e., as an issue that
is “fairly debatable.”8 Courts that have embraced the close question
standard have held that, in light of legislative history, the fairly debatable
standard does not go as far as Congress intended in restricting bail.9 On the
2. As one judge put it: “[T]he unjust deprivation, for a single hour of one man’s liberty,
creates a debt that can never be repaid.” Johnson v. United States, 218 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir.
1954) (Stephens, J., concurring). There are other policy reasons to favor granting bail pending
appeal, including allowing defendants time post-conviction to continue earning a paycheck, so that
they may start paying off any restitution obligation. Another important (yet overlooked) point in
favor of a liberal bail-pending-appeal policy is that it will give defendants and their families a
longer time to adjust to the idea that the defendant will be serving prison time. For example, during
this extra time, the convicted can make sure any dependents will be provided for during his
incarceration.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (2000).
4. Id.
5. See infra Part III.
6. Id.
7. See cases cited infra note 82 (listing the nine courts of appeals that have defined a
substantial question as a close question).
8. United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1281–82 (9th Cir. 1985).
9. See cases cited infra note 82.
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other hand, the Ninth Circuit resurrected the fairly debatable standard by
arguing that Congress intended to use the historical meaning of substantial
question.10 This Article sides with the Ninth Circuit and argues that the
fairly debatable standard is the correct standard—an interpretation
supported by common sense and a close look at the 1984 Bail Act’s
legislative history.
The difference between the standards is not merely an academic
concern. Many legal questions that are “fairly debatable” are not “close.”
Defendants can and do fall in that gap.11 But should we be concerned about
such defendants? It might not seem troublesome when a court denies bail
to a defendant whose direct appeal will not raise a close question. After all,
if we are primarily concerned with defendants who serve prison time only
to have their conviction overturned on appeal, why should we care about
defendants whose appeal will not raise a single close question? Seemingly
by definition those cases will not result in a reversal. The problem lies in
the fact that, in practice, motions for bail must be filed soon after
sentencing to prevent defendants from having to report to prison at all.
That time frame means that defense counsel must quickly research the
arguments that will likely be made on appeal and hurriedly draft a motion.
And all this work must often be done without the benefit of
transcripts—the lifeblood of a defendant’s appeal12—which can take court
reporters several months to complete.13 As a result, even defendants with
highly meritorious appeals might not be able to meet their burden to prove
that their appeal will raise a close question.
This Article establishes that Congress was sensitive to this problem and
intended that courts use the fairly debatable standard—not the close
question standard. The analysis commences in Part II with an examination
of the three incarnations of the bail-pending-appeal standard that led up to
1984. Examining those three periods provides the necessary context for
understanding what Congress did when it passed the Bail Reform Act of
1984. Part III provides a brief overview of the current standard for bail

10. Handy, 761 F.2d at 1281–82.
11. For a discussion of one such defendant, see infra notes 110–18 and accompanying text.
12. Transcripts are often the most important part of the appellate record. See Mary
Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 577, 604–05 & n.175 (2002) (discussing a case in which the Supreme Court reversed a trial
court’s decision after reviewing the trial transcript).
13. While court reporters must “promptly” translate the shorthand they took during the
relevant proceeding into a transcript after a party requests it, see 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (2000), that
ideal is often not achieved, see United States v. Austin, 768 F.2d 302, 303 (10th Cir. 1985)
(McKay, J., dissenting) (noting the reality that court reporters often take months to complete trial
transcripts). In one notorious case, a court reporter took four years to complete a partial trial
transcript in a criminal case. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 431, 436–37
(1993) (denying the court reporter absolute immunity in a suit for damages).
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pending appeal. The Part focuses on the incipiency of the circuit split that
developed regarding the meaning of substantial question. Part IV then
takes advantage of the historical lessons learned in Part II to establish that
Congress intended for courts to use the historical definition of substantial
question.
II. BAIL PENDING APPEAL FROM 1879 UNTIL 1984
“Bail,” Justice Douglas famously wrote, “is basic to our system of
law.”14 Bail symbolizes the country’s bedrock concern for personal
freedom and the idea incorporated from English common law that “only
those incarcerations which arise from absolute necessity are just.”15
Indeed, ever since Congress granted federal appellate courts jurisdiction
over criminal cases in 1879, defendants have had the ability to obtain bail
pending appeal under at least some circumstances.16
This Part will examine those circumstances and how they changed from
1879 to 1984.17 Those 105 years can be neatly divided into three distinct
periods: 1879 to 1934, 1934 to 1956, and 1956 to 1984. The most fruitful
way to examine those periods is to view the way in which the three
primary components of the standard for bail pending appeal changed.
Those components are:
• The merit requirement. This requirement deals with
whether the defendant’s appeal must raise a non-frivolous
issue, a substantial question, or something else to entitle
the defendant to bail pending appeal.
• The burden-of-proof requirement. This requirement deals
with whether the defendant has the burden to prove he has
met the merit requirement or whether the government has
the burden to prove that the defendant has not met the
merit requirement.
• The character requirement. This requirement
encompasses whether the defendant can be denied bail
based on character issues, such as danger to the
community or flight risk.
As will become clear, the legislature and judiciary have, over time,
adjusted these requirements to find the right blend to balance the
individual’s liberty interest against the community’s interest in safety.
14. Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955).
15. William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33, 33–34
(1978).
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. For an incredibly thorough look at the history of the right to bail in the United States up
until 1977, see generally Duker, supra note 15.
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A. 1879–1934
Starting in 1879, when federal appellate courts were first granted
jurisdiction over writs of error in all federal criminal cases, Congress
provided that when such a writ was taken, “‘bail may . . . be taken.’”18
Twelve years later, the U.S. Supreme Court re-crafted the standard. The
new, equally nebulous test provided that:
Where such writ of error is allowed in the case of a
conviction of an infamous crime, or in any other criminal
case in which [the writ] will lie . . . the circuit court or district
court, or any justice or judge thereof, shall have power, . . . to
admit the accused to bail in such amount as may be fixed.19
The Supreme Court explained an oft-repeated rationale for the rule: “[A]
person accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty
in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo
imprisonment . . . .”20
Over time, the concept of a merit requirement implicit in the standard
took hold. Most courts, in practice, asked whether the appeal would
present any non-frivolous issues.21 If the defendant’s appeal would raise
a non-frivolous issue for the appellate court to decide, he would be entitled
to bail.22 But since the statute was silent on a merit requirement, no
uniform standard emerged. The Second Circuit, for example, required the
defendant to have a “reasonable chance of success” in his appeal.23 The
Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, seemed to believe that no merit
requirement existed and that as long as the defendant did not pose a flight
risk, bail pending appeal was mandatory.24 Courts also disagreed on the
precise scope of the character requirement.25

18. Id. at 112 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 2, 20 Stat. 354, 354
(repealed 1891)). The first federal statute to explicitly note the possibility of bail pending appeal
was enacted in 1866. Id. It provided that when a defendant appealed his state criminal case to the
U.S. Supreme Court, the decision whether to grant bail pending appeal rested with the state court.
Id.
19. SUP. CT. R. 36(2), 139 U.S. 706 (1891), cited in Duker, supra note 15, at 113.
20. Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895).
21. United States v. Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1212–13 (D.N.M. 1985) (“From 1891 to
1934 . . . . [t]he general rule was that bail pending appeal would be granted in most non-capital
cases unless there was a clear showing that the appeal was frivolous or taken for delay.”).
22. Id.
23. Garvey v. United States, 292 F. 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1923).
24. McKnight v. United States, 113 F. 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1902).
25. See Duker, supra note 15, at 114–15 (listing factors various circuits took into
consideration in determining whether bail pending appeal was proper).
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All courts agreed, however, that the government bore the burden to
prove that the defendant was not entitled to bail.26 This position reversed
the common law standard that placed the burden on the defendant.27
Flipping the burden back and forth between the government and the
defendant is a notable (but often unnoticed) theme in the history of bail
pending appeal and a common technique to either restrict or expand access
to bail pending appeal—during times when bail was disfavored, the
defendant shouldered the burden, whereas during times when bail was
favored, the government bore it.
The period from 1879–1934 was no exception, as many courts
recognized that in most cases defendants ought to be granted bail pending
appeal; as one court explained it: “[A]ccused and convicted persons under
ordinary circumstances and in the vast majority of cases should be
admitted to bail, both before their conviction and during the pendency of
their writs of error until the appellate court has affirmed the judgments
against them.”28 The court further explained that this rule reflected the idea
that a defendant who is denied bail pending appeal and has his conviction
reversed suffers the “same injustice” as a defendant who is imprisoned
before trial and is subsequently acquitted; Congress had enacted a lenient
standard to “prevent just such imprisonment.”29
B. 1934–1956
In 1934, the mishmash of rules that had evolved under the prior
standard gave way to a clearer, more restrictive rule. Apparently unhappy
with the lenient attitude reflected in the old standard, the Supreme Court
(pursuant to its rule-making authority) limited bail to defendants who
could prove that their appeal would raise “‘a substantial question which
should be determined by the appellate court.’”30

26. Debra L. Leibowitz, Release Pending Appeal: A Narrow Definition of ‘Substantial
Question’ Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 54 FORDHAM L. REV 1081, 1084–85 (1986) (noting
that the 1891 statute placed the “burden of demonstrating frivolousness on the government” and
that it marked the “first step toward making a merit[o]rious appeal a prerequisite for release”).
27. Duker, supra note 15, at 115 (citing United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D.N.J.
1934)).
28. Rossi v. United States, 11 F.2d 264, 265 (8th Cir. 1926); see also Jones v. United States,
12 F.2d 708, 709 (4th Cir. 1926) (“There may be unusual cases . . . that would warrant the court
to hesitate in granting bail; but these are exceptional cases . . . .”).
29. Rossi, 11 F.2d at 265–66.
30. Duker, supra note 15, at 115 (quoting SUP. CT. R. 6, 292 U.S. 663, 664 (1933)) (noting
that the Supreme Court used its rule-making authority to draft and codify this requirement as Rule
IV of the Criminal Appeal Rules). The rule was re-codified in 1946 as Rule 46(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 115 & n.536.
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Courts interpreted the standard as placing a threshold requirement on
the defendant to prove that his appeal would raise a substantial question.31
Once the defendant jumped that hurdle, the court had discretion to
determine whether bail was appropriate.32 Whether the defendant was a
flight risk or a danger to the community could then be considered.33 But
“the legal merit of the question presented to the appellate court [was] the
primary consideration in determining whether bail should be granted,” and
many reported bail decisions discussed only whether the defendant’s
appeal had sufficient merit to warrant bail.34
Justice Douglas, in his capacity as a Circuit Justice,35 was one of the
first judges to discuss the definition of “substantial question.” He equated

31. See United States v. Glazer, 14 F.R.D. 86, 88 (E.D. Mo. 1952) (“‘[T]wo requisites must
be met in order to justify the enlargement of a defendant on bail pending appeal. First, it must
appear that the case involves a substantial question of law. Second, it must appear that the case is
one in which, in the discretion of the Court, it is proper to grant bail.’” (quoting United States v.
Burgman, 89 F. Supp. 288, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1950))).
32. See cases cited supra note 31.
33. See Rossi, 11 F.2d at 265 (listing ways in which a court might use its discretion to deny
bail).
34. Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d 78, 80 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1960) (listing numerous cases
as support that, under both current law and pre-1956 law, the prime consideration in determining
whether a defendant was entitled to bail pending appeal was whether the defendant’s appeal had
sufficient merit).
35. The Supreme Court assigns one or more of its members to each of the appellate circuits
to act as that circuit’s Circuit Justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 42 (2000). As Justice Marshall explained,
when Supreme Court Justices act as a Circuit Justice, they act not for themselves alone, “but as a
surrogate for the entire Court, from whence [their] ultimate authority in these matters derives. A
Circuit Justice therefore bears a heavy responsibility to conscientiously reflect the views of his
Brethren as best he perceives them . . . .” Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1313 (Marshall,
Circuit Justice 1973). Historically, Justices often times in their capacity as a Circuit Justice, played
a large role in the development of the jurisprudence relating to bail pending appeal, as they chose
to actively participate in the bail-pending-appeal process. See Frank Felleman & John C. Wright,
Note, The Powers of the Supreme Court Justice Acting in an Individual Capacity, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 981, 991–98 (1964) (discussing the role Supreme Court Justices then played in determining
whether a defendant was entitled to bail pending appeal). For example, between 1956 and 1961,
the Justices received 113 bail motions, granting twenty-three of them. Id. at 1020. But the Justices’
attitudes have apparently changed regarding whether they should be actively participating in the
bail-pending-appeal process; it appears that the last time a Justice granted a bail-pending-appeal
motion was in 1978, when Justice Brennan, sitting as a Circuit Justice, allowed a defendant to
remain out on bail while he appealed his espionage conviction to the Fourth Circuit. See Truong
Dinh Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326, 1328–30 (Brennan, Circuit Justice 1978). Nevertheless,
defendants still do occasionally seek to obtain bail pending appeal from a Supreme Court
Justice—who then promptly denies the request. See, e.g., Chilingirian v. United States, 538 U.S.
958 (2003) (“Application for bail pending appeal addressed to Justice SOUTER and referred to the
Court denied.”); Koon v. United States, 510 U.S. 909, 909 (1993) (stating “The application for
release on bail pending appeal presented to Justice O’CONNOR and by her referred to the Court
is denied.”).
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the phrase with an issue that is “fairly debatable.”36 Later, he provided
additional guidance to district courts trying to determine whether a
defendant’s appeal would raise a fairly debatable issue:
[T]he first consideration is the soundness of the errors
alleged. Are they, or any of them, likely to command the
respect of the appellate judges? It is not enough that I am
unimpressed. I must decide whether there is a school of
thought, a philosophical view, a technical argument, an
analogy, an appeal to precedent or to reason commanding
respect that might possibly prevail.37
Justice Douglas’s formulation quickly became the leading understanding
of what constituted a “substantial question” as courts often cited his
definition as the proper understanding of the phrase.38
Changing the merit requirement to “substantial question” was a
welcome relief for some who saw the prior non-frivolous issue standard
as too lax. U.S. District Court Judge Holtzoff, for example, concluded that
the purpose of the change was to “restrict” the number of convicted
defendants eligible for bail and that the prior law’s broad presumption in
favor of bail was a “serious defect in the administration of criminal
justice.”39 Unfortunately for Judge Holtzoff, this period of “tough on bail”
would last only 22 years.
C. 1956–1984
In 1956, Congress once again approved a change to the standard for
bail pending appeal, dramatically expanding the pool of defendants
eligible for bail. The new standard provided that “[b]ail may be allowed
pending appeal or certiorari unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous
or taken for delay.”40 The standard was re-codified in the Bail Reform Act
of 1966 with one minor difference—the new standard explicitly
recognized what had always been implicit: the court could deny bail if the

36. D’Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 9th Cir. 1950).
37. Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955); see also
cases cited infra note 38 (illustrating some of the many courts that cited Justice Douglas’s
formulation of “substantial question”).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Warring, 16 F.R.D. 524, 526 (D. Md. 1954) (applying Justice
Douglas’s standard in considering a bail pending appeal motion and citing D’Aquino); United
States v. Stephenson, 110 F. Supp. 623, 627 (D. Alaska 1953) (same); United States v. Glazer, 14
F.R.D. 86, 88 (E.D. Mo. 1952) (same); United States v. Barker, 11 F.R.D. 421, 422 (N.D. Cal.
1951) (same); United States v. Barbeau, 92 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D. Alaska 1950) (same).
39. United States v. Burgman, 89 F. Supp. 288, 289 (D.D.C. 1950).
40. Duker, supra note 15, at 117 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(2) (as amended in 1956)).
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defendant was a flight risk or a danger to the community.41
Courts observed that once again the burden had flipped: the
government now bore the burden to prove that the defendant was not
entitled to bail.42 And the merit requirement once again required the
government to prove that any appeal would be frivolous.43
As with prior law, the frivolity of the appeal was only a threshold
condition. The government could also rely on a character requirement to
prevent defendants from obtaining bail.44 But, at least initially, the
government carried a heavy burden. In arguing flight risk, for example, it
was “incumbent upon the government to display a strong probability that
the defendant [would] become a fugitive.”45 In arguing danger to the
community, the government had to prove that the defendant presented
what Chief Justice Warren described as a “clear” threat.46 Midway through
this period, in 1972, Congress became more concerned about crime
problems and altered the character requirement, placing the burden on the
defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was not a
flight risk or a danger to the community.47 Even after the change, however,
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1970) (repealed 1984) (“A person . . . who has been convicted of an
offense and is either awaiting sentence or has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari,
shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of section 3146 unless the court or judge has
reason to believe that one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will
not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community. If such a risk of flight or danger
is believed to exist, or if it appears that an appeal is frivolous or taken for delay, the person may be
ordered detained.”); see also 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 767 (3d ed. 2004) (“Even before 1966, at a time when the rule was silent on the
subject, courts had considered that they could deny bail pending appeal to a defendant who was
likely to flee or who posed a danger to the community . . . .”). For a discussion of the 1966 Bail
Act, see Note, The Bail Reform Act of 1966, 53 IOWA L. REV. 170, 177–88 (1967).
42. See Duker, supra note 15, at 117 n.544 (listing cases).
43. Fiano v. United States, 259 F.2d 135, 136 (9th Cir. 1958) (noting the change from the
substantial question standard to the non-frivolous standard).
44. Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1960) (“Although the most important
factor to consider is whether the appeal is frivolous, there are other considerations which may
justify the denial of bail pending appeal both under the old and new rules. The one most often
mentioned is the likelihood of the defendant absconding.” (footnote omitted)); see also Duker,
supra note 15, at 117–18 (listing the various factors courts took into consideration).
45. See Duker, supra note 15, at 118 (emphasis added) (citing Rhodes, 275 F.2d at 81).
46. Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994, 996 (Warren, Circuit Justice 1962) (noting that if
the government cannot prove the defendant’s direct appeal will raise only frivolous issues, bail
should only be denied “in cases in which, from substantial evidence, it seems clear that the right
to bail may be abused or the community may be threatened by the applicant’s release”); see also
Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38 (Black, Circuit Justice 1968) (concluding that bail pending
appeal should be denied only when the defendant posed the “kind of danger that so jeopardizes the
public” that detaining him is the only option).
47. See FED. R. APP. P. 9(c) (1972) (“The decision as to release pending appeal shall be made
in accordance with [The Bail Reform Act of 1966]. The burden of establishing that the defendant
will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community rests with the defendant.”).
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some courts resisted implementing a tough character requirement. The
Third Circuit, for instance, warned that defendants were to be denied bail
pending appeal because of concerns about safety only when the “danger
to the community posed by the defendant . . . [is] of such dimension that
only his incarceration can protect against it.”48
Courts quickly realized the revolution brought about by switching from
the fairly debatable standard to the non-frivolous issue standard. For
example, Justice Frankfurter, acting in his capacity as a Circuit Justice,
concluded that the new non-frivolous issue standard “greatly liberalized”
the bail standard. Granting bail would occur “more readily under the new
standard than it [had] under the old concept of ‘substantial question,’”
Justice Frankfurter commented—a conclusion, he added, that even the
government agreed with.49 Justice Frankfurter later continued:
The Government commendably acknowledges that the new
Rule has made an important change. The Rule expresses a
general attitude, the significance of which is that inasmuch as
an appeal from a conviction is a matter of right, the risk of
incarceration for a conviction that may be upset is normally
to be guarded against by allowing bail unless the appeal is so
baseless as to deserve to be condemned as “frivolous” or is
sought as a device for mere delay.50

Many saw the shifting of the burden on the issue of danger to the community and flight risk as
being in tension with the general liberal attitude toward release provided by the 1966 Bail Act. See
generally Paul D. Inman, Bail Pending Appeal in Federal Court: The Need for a Two-Tiered
Approach, 57 TEX. L. REV. 275, 284–85 (1979) (noting the tension and resolving it by arguing that
the “principles of the [1966] Bail Reform Act should govern” if the direct appeal is “substantial,”
but that the principles inherent in placing the burden on the defendant to prove he is not a danger
to the community or a flight risk should apply if the defendant’s appeal is “insubstantial”).
48. United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1979).
49. Ward v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 1063, 1065 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice 1956). The Fifth
Circuit likewise noted that the change from substantial question to non-frivolous issue “was
intended to liberalize the granting of bail pending appeal.” Leary v. United States, 431 F.2d 85,
88–89 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting this liberalized approach “was reflected in a series of decisions
by individual Justices designed to insure [sic] that bail pending appeal would be fairly considered
so that even the most unsavory defendants would not be incarcerated before their convictions were
ultimately upheld or be denied bail as a form of punishment”); see also Fiano v. United States, 259
F.2d 135, 136 (9th Cir. 1958) (concluding that the court “[did] not doubt” that in changing the
standard from substantial question to non-frivolous issue, there was an intent to establish a “much
lighter standard”); United States v. Esters, 161 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (concluding
that the change in standards was intended to “effect[] a liberalization in the matter of bail pending
appeal”).
50. Ward, 76 S. Ct. at 1065.
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As a result, bail pending appeal was once again favored.51 This greatly
liberalized standard set the stage for the 1984 Bail Act, to which the
analysis now turns.
III. COURTS DIVIDE OVER THE MEANING OF “SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION ”
IN THE 1984 BAIL ACT
In 1984, President Reagan signed the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act52 into law, reshaping large swaths of the criminal code and affecting
everything from the contours of the insanity defense to sentencing.53 A
small piece of that legislation is the Bail Reform Act of 1984,54 which
made a number of changes to bail practice.55 The impetus for bail reform
was public concern about crimes committed by those out on bail, and most
of the legislation changed bail practice with respect to defendants likely to
re-offend.56
For present purposes, the most pertinent portion of the 1984 Bail Act
altered the standard for bail pending appeal. Congress wanted to change
the standard not only to address general public fears about crime, but also
to address a concern specific to appeals. As the Act’s legislative history

51. See, e.g., Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1960)
(noting that bail pending appeal was “heavily favored”); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85,
94 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that bail pending appeal should be denied only as a matter of “last
resort”); Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1960) (“[N]ormally bail should be
allowed pending appeal, and it is only in an unusual case that denial is justified.”); United States
v. Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 318, 320–21 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“Nonetheless, the [1966 Bail Reform] Act
establishes a policy strongly favoring post-trial as well as pretrial release.”); United States v. Ursini,
276 F. Supp. 993, 997 (D. Conn. 1967) (recognizing that bail pending appeal should be denied only
in “extraordinary” cases).
52. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21,
28, 29, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
53. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3184 (noting
that the Comprehensive Control Act made “major comprehensive improvements to the federal
criminal laws,” including “sentencing reform, bail reform, insanity defense amendments, drug
penalty amendments, [and] criminal forfeiture improvements”).
54. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150, 3062 (2000).
55. See generally Richard A. Powers III, Detention Under the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1984, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 413 (1985) (discussing some of the changes brought about by the Bail
Reform Act of 1984).
56. Powers, supra note 55, at 414 (explaining the need for reform to allow judges discretion
to gauge the risk of a defendant’s “danger to the community”); see also Donald P. Lay & Jill De
La Hunt, The Bail Reform Act of 1984: A Discussion, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 929, 930 (1985)
(noting the need for detention if defendants were “community safety hazards”); S. REP. NO. 98-225,
at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3185 (“Many of the changes in the Bail Reform Act
incorporated in this bill reflect the Committee’s determination that Federal Bail laws must address
the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release and must give the courts adequate
authority to make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may
pose to others if released.”).
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explains, prior law had “a presumption in favor of bail even after
conviction” and Congress wanted to “eliminate” that presumption.57 With
those concerns in mind, the new legislation provided that defendants
sentenced to prison would be denied bail unless the defendant had met his
burden to prove:
(1) by clear and convincing evidence that [he] is not likely to
flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the
community . . . and
(2) that [his] appeal . . . [will] raise[] a substantial question of
law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new
trial.58
While the new character requirement was clear—defendants now had
to offer clear and convincing proof that they would not flee or be a danger
while on bail—the new merit requirement was not. What was a
“substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order
for a new trial”?
The first appellate court to work through its meaning was the Third
Circuit in United States v. Miller59—an opinion that quickly became the
departure point for interpreting the 1984 Bail Act. Despite the controversy
that would later surround the meaning of “substantial question,” the Third
Circuit, without discussion or even a citation, stated that a substantial
question is an issue that is either “novel, which has not been decided by
controlling precedent, or which is fairly doubtful.”60 The standard
resembled the historical fairly debatable standard announced by Justice
Douglas.61 It is likely that the Miller court did intend to simply quote the
prior fairly debatable verbiage, but instead settled on fairly doubtful. This
reading would explain why the court offered up little defense of its
definition—the court thought it uncontroversial that Congress did not
accidentally use the exact phrase from a prior version of the same
standard.
In any event, the Third Circuit next addressed what it thought was the
controversial portion of the standard: what Congress meant when it

57. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3209.
58. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 1981–82 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3143(b) (2000)); see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3210
(noting the Committee’s intent that under § 3143 the burden of showing the merit of the appeal
should now rest with the defendant).
59. 753 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1985).
60. Id. at 23.
61. Later, the Third Circuit essentially merged this standard with the Ninth Circuit’s fairly
debatable standard. See infra note 78.
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required that the substantial question was “‘likely to result in reversal or
an order for a new trial.’”62 The court rejected the meaning the district
court assigned to it: that a district court must conclude that its own rulings
were likely to be reversed.63 The court was “unwilling to attribute to
Congress the cynicism” that a district court judge could grant bail pending
appeal only if it believed it were likely to be reversed—something that
would presumably never happen.64 The Miller court also found that
defining the phrase in that way would render the “substantial question”
portion of the statute superfluous: any question likely to result in reversal
would necessarily be a substantial question.65 Thus, the court sensibly
interpreted the phrase to require the district court to determine whether, if
the substantial question were decided in the defendant’s favor, it would
likely result in a reversal or an order for a new trial.66 For example, even
if the substantial question were decided in the defendant’s favor, it might
be harmless error, in which case the defendant would not be entitled to bail
because the conviction would not be overturned.67
Following Miller, the other circuits unanimously agreed that the 1984
Bail Act required them to go through the two-step process:68 they were to
determine whether the defendant’s direct appeal would raise a substantial
question and then determine whether that question, if decided in the
defendant’s favor, would likely result in a new trial or a reversal.69 The
controversy focused on what constituted a “substantial question.”

62. Miller, 753 F.2d at 23 (quoting the new standard).
63. Id.
64. Id. Many district courts imputed this cynical appraisal to Congress—this interpretation
was quite common among district courts in the immediate aftermath of the 1984 Bail Act’s passage.
See Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 56, at 947 (“District courts confronted with [‘likely to result’]
language have interpreted it subjectively, believing the provision to require them to state a belief
that they will be reversed on appeal.”). Eventually, even the government abandoned this view of
the statute. See United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting the
government’s change in position).
65. Miller, 753 F.2d at 23.
66. Id. At least one district court—in a thorough opinion—independently came to the same
conclusion as the Third Circuit. See United States v. Lamp, 606 F. Supp. 193, 194–98 (W.D. Tex.
1985) (examining the statutory construction and legislative history of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act).
67. See United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 1985) (“We also agree with the
other circuits that the language in the statute which reads ‘likely to result in reversal or an order for
a new trial’ is a requirement that the claimed error not be harmless or unprejudicial.”).
68. See cases cited infra note 82.
69. In 1990, Congress amended the 1984 Bail Reform Act to clarify that bail pending appeal
was also appropriate not only when the substantial question would likely result in a reversal or an
order for a new trial, but also in cases where it would likely result in a “sentence that does not
include a term of imprisonment” or a “reduced sentence . . . less than the total of the time already
served plus the expected duration of the appeal process.” See United States v. Chang, No. 90-053301, 1992 WL 2417, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 1992) (noting that the change occurred in 1990).
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Other appellate courts quickly criticized the Third Circuit’s definition
of substantial question. The first to do so was the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Giancola,70 where the court noted that the Third Circuit
allowed for questions not covered by “controlling precedent” to be labeled
a substantial question.71 But some issues are not covered by controlling
precedent because they are “so patently without merit that it has not been
found necessary for [them] to have been resolved.”72 The Eleventh Circuit
then refused to adopt the Third Circuit’s definition wholesale, finding that
it failed to go far enough in effectuating congressional intent to reverse the
presumption in favor of bail as reflected in the 1984 Bail Act’s legislative
history.73 The court, without acknowledging the historical definition of
substantial question, then invented its own definition: a substantial
question was a “close question.”74
Next, the Ninth Circuit weighed in. In United States v. Handy,75 in an
opinion authored by Judge Reinhardt (over Judge Farris’s dissent),76 the
court adopted the historical definition of substantial question: a question
that is “fairly debatable.”77 According to Judge Reinhardt, the standard is
the functional equivalent of the Third Circuit’s test.78
Judge Reinhardt pointed to two strands of cases to support his view that
the phrase “substantial question” had historically been understood to mean
a fairly debatable issue. First, he observed that, as discussed above, when
the prior bail-pending-appeal standard had included the substantial
question requirement, courts had adopted Justice Douglas’s fairly
debatable standard.79 Second, just a year before Congress passed the 1984
Bail Act, the Supreme Court had determined that in the habeas context an
70. 754 F.2d 898 (11th Cir. 1985).
71. Id. at 901.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 900–01.
74. Id. at 901.
75. 761 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1985).
76. Id. at 1284 (Farris, J., dissenting); see infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing Judge Farris’s
dissent).
77. Handy, 761 F.2d at 1281–82.
78. Id. at 1282. Later, the Third Circuit modified its standard and essentially adopted the
Ninth Circuit’s fairly debatable standard. See United States v. Smith, 793 F.2d 85, 89 (3d Cir.
1986). In Smith, the Third Circuit recognized “that a number of courts of appeals view our Miller
definition as incomplete.” Id. It responded to these objections “by refer[ring] to the requirement that
a question which is not governed by controlling precedent nonetheless must be significant. Clearly,
an issue that is ‘patently without merit’ cannot qualify as significant.” Id. The court concluded by
seemingly abandoning the approach laid out in Miller and siding with the Ninth Circuit: “Where
there is any doubt as to significance, we believe it is preferable to resort to the historical approach
outlined in . . . Handy, rather than to the ‘close’ question concept advocated by the Giancola court.”
Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Kale, 661 F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(interpreting Smith as defining “substantial question” as a “‘fairly debatable’ question”).
79. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1281.
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issue involving a “‘substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right’”
(i.e., a substantial question) was an issue that is “‘debatable among jurists
of reason’” (i.e., a fairly debatable issue).80 Given this history, Judge
Reinhardt presumed that Congress intended to use the historically settled
definition of “substantial question.”81
Nevertheless, in short order, every other circuit sided with the Eleventh
Circuit and essentially parroted its reasoning: the fairly debatable standard
failed to go far enough to effectuate Congress’s intent in restricting bail
pending appeal.82 As an en banc Eighth Circuit succinctly put it: “We
believe [the close question standard] is more responsive to the announced
purpose of Congress, which was, bluntly, that fewer convicted persons
remain at large while pursuing their appeals.”83 The court’s terse reasoning
typifies the analysis of the other circuits, whose support in selecting the
close question standard rarely stretched beyond a single sentence.84
80. Id. at 1281–82 (alteration in original) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 &
n.4 (1983), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (2000), as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473 (2000)). In the habeas context, a petitioner can appeal the district court’s denial of his
habeas petition only if the district court issued a “certificate of probable cause,” which courts
equate with requiring the petitioner to demonstrate a “substantial showing of the denial of [a]
federal right.” See, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 892–93 (alteration in original). In other words, the
petitioner has to show that his appeal of the denial of his petition will raise a “substantial question.”
See Foster v. Field, 413 F.2d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 1969); see also Ramsey v. Hand, 309 F.2d 947,
948 (10th Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court noted that this standard placed the burden on the
petitioner to prove his appeal would raise issues that “are debatable among jurists of reason.”
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n.4. In 1996, the standard was slightly changed by statute, and a habeas
petitioner must now show a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right—not just a
federal right. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). A “certificate of probable cause”
is also now called a “certificate of appealability.” See id. at 480. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have
recognized that the substantial-showing requirement in the certificate of appealability context is
essentially the same as the substantial question test in the bail-pending-appeal context. See, e.g.,
United States v. Grogg, No. 2:06-cr-0008-JKS, 2007 WL 2904292, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2007)
(“The test as defined in Handy [i.e., the Fairly Debatable standard] is very similar to the test for a
certificate of appealability . . . .”). This Article contends that this view is exactly right.
81. Handy, 761 F.2d at 1282–83.
82. See United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 1985) (adopting the close
question standard); United States v. Randell, 761 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Steinhorn, 927 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020,
1023–24 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pollard, 778 F.2d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 298–99 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227,
1232–34 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 952 (10th Cir.1985) (en
banc); United States v. Perholtz, 836 F.2d 554, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The one (brief) exception
to this deluge was the Fifth Circuit, which in an unpublished order adopted the “Handy/Miller”
standard, see Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d at 1022 n.5 (citing In re Canale, No. 85-3052 (5th Cir.
Mar. 28, 1985)), but in Valera-Elizondo, however, it backed off and adopted the close question
standard, see id. at 1024.
83. Powell, 761 F.2d at 1232.
84. The First Circuit was typical in this respect: “We think that the Giancola test more
accurately reflects the intent of Congress to restrict access to bail pending appeal and adopt its
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The state of the law on the meaning of “substantial question” has not
changed since. On one side of the road sits the Ninth Circuit. On the other
side sits every other circuit except for the Third Circuit, which sits in the
road near the Ninth Circuit’s curb.
IV. CONGRESS INTENDED THAT COURTS INTERPRET A
“SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION ” AS A “FAIRLY DEBATABLE ” ISSUE
This Article now turns to why the Ninth Circuit is correct. This Part
first discusses the concerns that led to bail reform—concerns that had
nothing to do with the merit requirement. This Part next explores the legal
consequences of Congress’s decision to fashion a merit requirement by
using a phrase—a “substantial question”—that has a well-settled meaning
and history. The most salient consequence is that courts must presume that
Congress intended to use the settled definition unless there is clear
evidence to the contrary. Finally, this Part addresses the arguments that
Congress did not intend courts to interpret a substantial question as a fairly
debatable issue. Those arguments face two obstacles: first, the
improbability that Congress intended to dramatically alter the merit
requirement given that its expressed concerns addressed only the character
and burden-of-proof requirements; and second, the strong legal
presumption that Congress intends to import a phrase’s well-settled
meaning. This Part then concludes that those contrary arguments marshal
insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the historical
definition of a “substantial question” as being fairly debatable.
A. The Motivation Driving Bail Reform Had Nothing to Do
with the Merit Requirement
In passing the 1984 Bail Act, Congress wanted to reduce the public’s
anxiety about rising crimes rates by ensuring that those free on bail were
not prone to committing more crimes. Because convictions are presumed
correct on appeal, Congress also wanted to reverse the presumption in
favor of bail pending appeal.85 And in responding to these concerns, as the
Eight Circuit “bluntly” explained it, “Congress [intended] that fewer
convicted persons remain at large while pursuing their appeals.”86 History
demonstrates how Congress responded both to the concern about rising
crime rates—by placing an unprecedented burden on the defendant to
prove he will not be a danger to the community—and the concern about

‘substantial question’ definition.” Bayko, 774 F.2d at 523. The court offered no further analysis.
See id.
85. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
86. Powell, 761 F.2d at 1232.
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reversing the presumption in favor of bail—by placing the burden on the
defendant to prove that his appeal will raise a meritorious issue. Neither
of these concerns had anything to do with restricting the level of merit that
the defendant would have to prove his appeal will raise.
1. Congress’s Prime Motivation in Restricting Bail Pending Appeal
Related to the Character Requirement
In altering the standard for bail pending appeal, Congress was reacting
to public concerns about “the alarming problem of crimes committed by
persons on release.”87 Recall that only a small portion of the 1984 Bail
Reform Act was aimed at altering the standard for bail pending
appeal—most of the Act thoroughly overhauled general bail practice to
give judges the tools to keep defendants who were likely to re-offend off
the streets. As one judge summarized it: “The whole tenor of the 1984
[Bail Act] addresses the problems of safety of the community or of other
persons . . . .”88 Congress saw the shift in focus to public safety concerns
as a “significant departure” from prior bail law, which centered solely on
concerns about assuring the “appearance of the defendant at judicial
proceedings.”89
Given this backdrop, Congress unsurprisingly was dissatisfied with the
character requirement in the standard for bail pending appeal. A mere 12
years before Congress passed the 1984 Bail Act, criminals who were
threats to public safety would not necessarily be denied bail pending
appeal—the government had to prove that they were clear threats.90 Even
when Congress changed this standard in 1972, a defendant could still be

87. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185.
88. Powers, supra note 55, at 414; see also Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 56, at 930 (“The
principal features of the 1984 [Bail Act] allow the detention of certain defendants pending trial or
appeal if they are found to be, among other things, community safety hazards.”).
89. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3185–86. Later, in 1990,
Congress further underscored the concern for public safety by passing the Mandatory Detention
Act, which prevented defendants convicted of certain categories of dangerous crimes from being
eligible for bail pending appeal without “exceptional reasons” being present. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3143(b)(2), 3145(c) (2000). The Act provides that violent offenders, in addition to those
convicted of drug offenses with a maximum sentence of at least ten years and those convicted of
any offense with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death, are not eligible for release
unless “it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why [their] detention would not be
appropriate.” Id. §§ 3145(c), 3145(f). The exceptional-reasons requirement must be met in addition
to the requirements defendants must normally meet to be entitled to bail pending appeal. United
States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1991). For a look at how courts have interpreted
the “exceptional reasons” requirement, see Jonathan S. Rosen, An Examination of the “Exceptional
Reasons” Jurisprudence of the Mandatory Detention Act: Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143, 3145(c), 19 VT.
L. REV. 19, 25–45 (1994).
90. See cases cited supra note 46.
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released on bail if he could prove that he was likely not a threat to the
community.91 Because of Congress’s dissatisfaction, the 1984 Bail Act
swept aside the prior character requirement to make way for an
unprecedented standard—that defendants would have to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that they were not a threat to the community.92
In the previous one-hundress-plus years of bail-pending-appeal standards,
defendants had never had to meet such an onerous burden.
But courts, in deciding how to interpret the 1984 Bail Act, seem
completely unaware of these facts. The Eighth Circuit, for example, noted
that Congress would not have gone through “the trouble” of passing bail
reform if it knew courts would use the fairly debatable standard as opposed
to the close question standard.93 This line of reasoning makes no sense in
light of the evidence that Congress’s primary concern was public
safety—not a concern that defendants with meritless appeals were being
let out on bail. Moreover, in light of these facts, a prime argument used to
justify the close question standard falters: namely, that the fairly debatable
standard does not adequately limit, to the extent Congress intended, the
number of defendants out on bail pending appeal. The hidden assumption
is that Congress altered only the merit requirement to reach its desired
reduction in those out on bail. But that assumption is not correct. Congress
intended to place an important limit on defendants seeking bail by altering
the character requirement, which placed a new and unprecedented burden
on defendants.94
2. Congress’s Concern about Reversing the “Presumption” in Favor of
Bail Refers to the Burden-of-Proof Requirement
The second concern that Congress wanted to address in passing the
1984 Bail Act was the “presumption in favor of bail.”95 The Act’s
legislative history explains that “the basic distinction” between the current
and prior standards for bail pending appeal “is one of presumption.”96 The
legislative history continues:

91. See supra text accompanying note 47 (noting that a defendant only had to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was not a flight risk or a danger to the community); see also
United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting the need for a great threat to
the community to warrant denial of bail).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b).
93. United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1985).
94. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 26–27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3209–10.
95. Id. at 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3209.
96. Id.
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It has been held that although denial of bail after conviction
is frequently justified, the current statute incorporates a
presumption in favor of bail even after conviction. It is the
presumption that the Committee wishes to eliminate . . . .
. . . . Once guilt of a crime has been established in a court of
law, there is no reason to favor release pending imposition of
sentence or appeal. The conviction, in which the defendant’s
guilt of a crime has been established beyond a reasonable
doubt, is presumptively correct in law.97
Courts have, at times, cited the fact that Congress wanted to reverse the
presumption in favor of bail pending appeal in its discussion of how to
define a “substantial question,” thus signaling their belief that the two are
related.98 The D.C. Circuit, for example, inferred such a connection: “We
adopt [the close question standard, the] more demanding standard, because
it appears better to accord with the expressed congressional intent to
increase the required showing on the part of the defendant. The law has
shifted from a presumption of release to a presumption of valid
conviction.”99 The court offered no other reason to select one standard over
the other.
On its face, however, the legislative history cited above plainly
addresses the issue of who carries the burden on the bail motion—nothing
more.100 Under the standard used before 1984, the government had the
burden to prove that the defendant was not entitled to bail pending
appeal.101 The legislative history takes issue with that burden allocation,
97. Id. (footnotes omitted).
98. In fact, in selecting the close question standard, the only legislative history courts often
cited was the fact that Congress wanted to reverse the presumption in favor of bail, thus seeming
to indicate that this piece of legislative history supported use of the close question standard. The
Eleventh Circuit, for example—the originator of the close question standard—endorsed this flawed
reasoning. See United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that Congress
wanted to reverse the presumption in favor of bail that existed under prior law). Likewise, the Fifth
Circuit, in choosing the close question standard over the fairly debatable standard, quotes from the
Eleventh Circuit’s discussion of the fact that Congress wished to “reverse the presumption in favor
of bail,” but offers no indication of why it would chose one standard over another. See United
States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Affleck,
765 F.2d 944, 952 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that the 1984 Bail Act “was intended to
reverse the presumption in favor of bail pending appeal under the former law and to make the
standards for granting bail pending appeal more stringent”).
99. United States v. Perholtz, 836 F.2d 554, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing S. REP. NO. 98225, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3210).
100. See Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 56, at 947 (summarizing the 1984 Bail Act’s
legislative history as making clear “Congress’s intent to eliminate the presumption favoring release
pending appeal and to place the burden of establishing the four requirements under subsection (b)
on the defendant”).
101. See supra Part II.C.
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pointing out that the newly revised standard now places the burden on the
defendant.102 Congress determined that in the context of bail pending
appeal, it makes little sense to require the government to prove that the
defendant will not raise meritorious issues when, as the legislative history
notes, there is already a built-in legal presumption on appeal that the
defendant’s conviction is “correct.”103
If there were any doubt as to what Congress meant by reversing the
presumption in favor of bail, an examination of the legislative history
makes it clear. Immediately after the legislative history discusses a
“presumption in favor of bail,” it footnotes a case that discusses who has
the burden on a bail motion.104 Moreover, the Judiciary Committee Report
perhaps puts the matter to rest by stating: “The Committee intends that in
overcoming the presumption in favor of detention the burden of proof rests
with the defendant.”105
A discussion of how a defendant would rebut the “presumption”—that
is, how much of a showing a defendant would need to make to
demonstrate that his appeal will raise a substantial question—is
conspicuously missing from the cited legislative history. From this
omission we can conclude that Congress’s desire to reverse the
presumption in favor of bail had nothing to do with how it wanted to
define “ substantial question”. It is therefore puzzling that courts would
link the definition of substantial questions to Congress’s decision to
reverse the presumption in favor of bail.106
Indeed, the fact that Congress notes that “the basic distinction” between
the prior and current standards for bail pending appeal is its decision to
reverse the presumption in favor of bail seems to be a fatal blow to
defenders of the close question standard.107 If Congress wanted a radically
different and much stricter definition of substantial question, it would be
hard to claim that reversing the burden of proof was the basic distinction
between current and prior law.
The history of bail pending appeal demonstrates that simply reversing
the burden of proof on the merit requirement was a common response to
102. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3209.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 26 n.91, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3209 n.91 (citing United States v.
Bynum, 344 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). The court in Bynum dealt with defendants who wanted
to be released after they were convicted, but before they were sentenced. 344 F. Supp. at 648. The
court noted that the defendants “suggest that it is the Government’s burden after conviction to show
that bail release should be denied. Section 3148 does not explicitly contain any such requirements.”
Id.
105. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3210, quoted in United
States v. Vance, 851 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1988).
106. See supra note 98 (providing examples of courts believing there is some link between
reversing the presumption in favor of bail and defining the substantial question).
107. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3209.
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the desire to restrict or expand the availability of bail pending appeal.
Through each of the three reform periods discussed above, the burden on
the bail motion ricocheted back and forth. In 1984, Congress simply
reversed the arrangement one more time.
This point should not be surprising because placing the burden on the
defendant can dramatically alter the chances of successfully obtaining bail.
Motions for bail pending appeal are filed soon after the conviction—much
sooner than the opening direct appeal brief would be filed. Thus, a
defendant might not be able to meet his burden simply because of the
compressed time frame.108 For example, if the defendant intended to raise
on appeal the question of whether his right to cross-examine a key
government witness was unreasonably limited, he might not be able to
meet his burden because the trial transcripts might not yet be available and
so he could not provide the court with specific examples of where his
cross-examination was denied.109 As a result, when defendants shoulder
the burden on the bail motion, even defendants who will eventually prevail
on their appeals could be denied bail.
One extraordinary, real-life example of this problem occurred shortly
after the passage of the 1984 Bail Act. In United States v. Austin,110 Austin
argued in the district court that he should be granted bail because his
appeal would raise the substantial question of whether the government had
provided sufficient evidence to prove he had committed a crime.111 The
district court denied bail, noting that it could only do a “preliminary
review” without the benefit of trial transcripts, which the court reporters
had not yet completed.112 On appeal of that denial, the Tenth Circuit
remanded the case in light of its recently issued decision construing the
1984 Bail Act.113 One judge dissented and questioned whether the 1984
Bail Act met the minimum requirements of due process; the judge noted

108. Cf. Toussaint v. Klem, 131 F. App’x 383, 383–84 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming district
court’s denial of bail pending appeal after a pro se defendant “fail[ed] to present any argument even
remotely relating to bail”); United States v. Marshall, 78 F.3d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that
the defendant was not entitled to bail because he had not even identified the issues he would raise
on appeal); United States v. Montoya, 908 F.2d 450, 451 (9th Cir. 1990) (criticizing the defendant’s
presentation of his appeal issues as “vague” and “cursory” and noting that “[w]e simply cannot
evaluate the merits of arguments that have not been set forth” and therefore denying the motion
since he could not meet his burden).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Crabtree, 754 F.2d 1200, 1201 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding the
district court’s denial of a defendant’s bail motion on the grounds that he had not met his burden
to prove that any of his various evidentiary challenges were substantial questions since he had not
provided a trial transcript).
110. United States v. Austin (Austin I), 768 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1985).
111. Id. at 303 (McKay, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 302 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944 (10th Cir.
1985)).
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that the defendant carried the heavy burden to prove that his appeal would
raise a close question, but was given neither the time nor the necessary
resources (i.e., trial transcripts) to meet that burden:
The government . . . makes a big issue of the absence of a
transcript to support the [defendant’s] claims. When one
considers the time constraints involved in this and in future
cases, that is of course the necessary result. This court will be
considering [motions for bail] in the absence of adequate
information. If not so serious, it would be laughable to excuse
this on the ground that the burden of supplying these
necessities lies on the person seeking bail pending appeal. We
ourselves have had to discipline some court reporters in cases
because of months of delay in preparing transcripts. Even if
court reporters were prompt, the time constraints obvious in
this and future cases make the task of appellants’ seeking bail
pending appeal one which I cannot conclude meets the
minimum standards of due process.114
On remand, the district court denied Austin bail, holding that even
though he was not a flight risk or a danger to the community, he could not
show that his sufficiency challenge was a “close question.”115 Austin was
then sent to prison, where he toiled for eight months, waiting for the Tenth
Circuit to rule on his appeal.116 When a ruling came down, the court held
that the government had not provided sufficient evidence to support
Austin’s conviction.117 Austin was promptly released from prison.118 This
story, which is not unique,119 provides a dramatic example of the

114. Id. at 303 (McKay, J., dissenting).
115. United States v. Austin (Austin II), 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1220, 1222 (D.N.M. 1985).
116. See United States v. Austin (Austin III), 786 F.2d 986, 990 (10th Cir. 1986).
117. Id. at 989.
118. Id.
119. Most bail motions are decided in “simple orders or in short, unpublished dispositions.”
United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1016 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, it is difficult to know how
many defendants are denied bail on the basis that their appeal will not raise a close question, only
to have their convictions reversed on appeal. But what is possible to know is that Austin is not the
only defendant to meet that description. For example, in United States v. Thompson, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the conviction of Georgia Thompson, finding that the alleged crime she had
committed (essentially, she departed from state administrative rules for politically motivated
reasons) was not a federal crime at all. 484 F.3d 877, 878 (7th Cir. 2007). But even though the
Seventh Circuit took the unusual step at oral argument of ordering Thompson to be immediately
released from prison, she had already spent approximately six months (of her eighteen-month
sentence) in jail, as she had been denied bail pending appeal. See id. (noting that the court ordered
the defendant released at oral argument); see also United States v. Thompson, No. 06-CR-20, slip
op. (E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2006) (order denying bail pending appeal). Likewise, in United States v.
Santos, the district court denied bail to Miriam Santos (Chicago’s city treasurer), holding that the
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importance of the placement of the burden on a bail motion and on the
pitfalls of requiring the defendant to prove that his appeal will raise a close
question instead of a fairly debatable one.120
With the key motivators that led to bail reform in 1984 in mind, the
analysis now turns to Congress’s decision to require defendants seeking
bail to prove that their direct appeal will raise a “substantial question.”
B. Courts Should Presume That Congress Intended to Revive the
Historical Definition of Substantial Question
As a matter of common sense, it would be odd if Congress were to
resurrect a phrase with a settled legal meaning but silently expect courts
to assign an entirely new meaning to that phrase. This observation is
particularly true when the phrase’s prior meaning arose in an earlier
version of the same standard in which it now appears. If Congress wanted
to give the phrase a new meaning, why would it use a phrase with a long
pedigree? At the very least, we should expect Congress to clearly express
its desire to courts that it wanted to depart from a well-established
meaning of a phrase.
Unsurprisingly, courts do indeed recognize these principles of
interpretation. Courts assume that “our elected representatives, like other
citizens, know the law.”121 If Congress crafts a statute using words with a
“well-known meaning,” courts presume Congress intended to use that
meaning “unless the context compels to the contrary.”122 This is true even

errors she claimed in her corruption trial were not “close questions.” 65 F. Supp. 2d 802, 806, 850
(N.D. Ill. 1999). Later, the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the district court
judge made a “litany of errors,” including rulings involving important evidentiary matters. United
States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 965 (7th Cir. 2000). Santos spent four months in jail. See Steve
Warmbir, The Santos Standard, ILL. ISSUES, Feb. 2001, at 22, 23, available at
http://www.lib.niu.edu/ipo/2001/ii010222.html. On remand, she pled guilty to one count of mail
fraud and received no prison time. Id.
120. Cf. United States v. Seegers, 433 F.2d 493, 494–95 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (granting a defendant
bail pending appeal, when then-current law dictated a presumption in favor of bail, even though the
defendant had not yet received a copy of the trial transcripts, and defense counsel could only
tentatively list three questions that might result in reversal).
121. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696–97 (1979).
122. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) (“[W]here words are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this
country, they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary.”); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (refusing to extend insider
trading sanctions to non-traders because doing so would be a radical departure from prior law and
the Court would not assume Congress intended such a massive change “absent some explicit
evidence” of such an intent); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (“[W]here . . . Congress
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have
had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the
new statute.”).
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when the prior meaning is judicially—rather than legislatively—crafted.123
This presumption may be strongest, and makes the most sense, where the
phrase at issue was used in prior versions of the same standard.124
Courts faced with interpreting the phrase “substantial question” in the
1984 Bail Act should have applied this common sense and presumed that
Congress intended to use the phrase’s historical definition. But they did
not. Instead, courts hardly mentioned that the phrase had a long pedigree,
and not a single court that rejected the historical definition noted the canon
in favor of assigning a phrase its historical meaning. For example, the
Tenth Circuit, in adopting the close question standard, mentions the fairly
debatable standard only in a footnote and never identifies it as the
historical definition.125 The Fourth Circuit failed even to mention the fairly
debatable standard, let alone grapple with the issue of whether Congress
intended to revive it.126 The Second Circuit, for its part, stated that it
believed that there was not much difference between the fairly debatable
and close question standards—yet still selected the historical close
question standard!127 Even courts that did recognize the fairly debatable
standard’s pedigree gave it little weight, reflexively deciding that the close
question standard better reflected Congress’s intent to restrict bail pending
appeal.128

123. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (“When . . . judicial interpretations have
settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new
statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as
well.”); see also Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580 (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative
or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute
without change.”).
124. Cf. 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22:33 (6th ed.
2002) (“[T]he legislature is presumed to know the prior construction of the original act, and if
words or provisions in the act or section amended that had been previously construed are repeated
in the amendment, it is held that the legislature adopted the prior construction of the word or
provision.”).
125. United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 952 n.12 (10th Cir.1985) (en banc).
126. United States v. Steinhorn, 927 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Pollard, 778 F.2d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1985) (adopting the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion to use the
close question standard); United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 298–99 (7th Cir. 1985)
(adopting the close question standard without even discussing the fairly debatable standard).
127. United States v. Randell, 761 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe [the
Miller, Giancola, and Handy] definitions of ‘substantial’ differ significantly from each other, but
if we were to adopt only one, it would be the language of Giancola.”); see also United States v.
Jackson, 876 F. Supp. 1221, 1223 (D. Kan. 1994) (equating a close question and a fairly debatable
issue by stating that a “substantial question . . . is a close question that is either fairly debatable or
fairly doubtful”).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 1985) (brushing aside the
historical definition of substantial question because the court doubted Congress would have
bothered to alter the standard for bail pending appeal if it wanted that definition resurrected).
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C. Arguments in Favor of the Close Question Standard are
Unconvincing
Although no court that adopted the close questions standard mentioned
any sort of presumption in favor of using the historical definition, some
courts did offer a substantive reason for not adopting the fairly debatable
standard: use of the standard would not restrict bail pending appeal as
much as Congress would have wanted.129 Thus, we can charitably
reinterpret their argument as follows: that while it makes sense to presume
that Congress intended to use the settled meaning of substantial question,
Congress made it clear that it intended to supplant the prior definition with
something more strict. This argument, however, still must be tempered by
the fact that there are strong reasons to believe that Congress did not
intend to significantly deviate from the settled definition of substantial
question, given that its primary concerns with the prior standard related
solely to the character and burden-of-proof requirements—not the merit
requirement. Given all of this, was Congress’s intent to abandon the fairly
debatable standard clear?
The answer is a resounding no. As a threshold issue, the sentences
typically plucked from the 1984 Bail Act’s legislative history to support
use of the close question standard—sentences that note Congress wanted
to reverse the presumption in favor of bail—have nothing to do with how
courts are to interpret “substantial question.”130 As explained above, they
reflect Congress’s decision to place the bail motion burden of proof on the
defendant.131 Thus, those statements offer no support for the close
questions standard or the idea that congress did not intend to revive the
fairly debatable standard. Courts have offered other pieces of evidence to
support their defense of the close question standard. But when analyzed,
that evidence fails to rebut the heavy presumption in favor of the fairly
debatable standard.
1. The D.C. Bail Act’s Legislative History Does Not Support
Use of the Close Question Standard
One argument occasionally invoked to support the idea that Congress
did not intend to revive the historical definition of substantial question is

129. See, e.g., United States v. Bayko, 774 F2d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 1985) (brushing aside the
historical definition of substantial question because the court doubted Congress would have
bothered to alter the standard for bail pending appeal if it wanted that definition resurrected).
130. See supra note 99 (listing cases implying a connection between Congress’s decision to
reverse the presumption in favor of bail and its alleged intent not to revive the fairly debatable
standard).
131. See supra note Part IV.A.2.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss4/1

26

Keller: Resolving a "Substantial Question": Just Who is Entitled to Bail

2008]

JU ST W H O IS EN TITLED TO BAIL PEN D IN G APPEAL U N D ER TH E BAIL RE FO RM AC T O F 1984?

851

made most forcefully by Judge Farris in his dissent in Handy—the Ninth
Circuit case that adopted the Fairly Debatable standard.132 Judge Farris
first explained that Congress noted in the 1984 Bail Act’s legislative
history that it modeled the Act on certain provisions found in the District
of Columbia Code addressing the circumstances entitling a defendant to
bail pending appeal;133 Congress passed those provisions in 1971 and
included the same “substantial question” requirement.134 In the legislative
history of the D.C. Bail Act, Congress elucidated the purpose for the
change in bail standards: “‘[O]nce a person has been convicted and
sentenced to jail, there is absolutely no reason for the law to favor release
pending appeal or even permit it in the absence of exceptional
circumstances.’”135 Requiring a defendant to prove his direct appeal would
raise only fairly debatable issues, which were not “exceptional
circumstances,” or so Judge Farris surmised.
While defenders of the close question standard trot out quotes from the
D.C. Bail Act’s legislative history from time to time, the history has
dubious value in interpreting the 1984 Bail Act. The 1984 Bail Act’s
legislative history does not contain the “exceptional circumstance”
language of the 1971 D.C. Bail Act, undercutting its relevance in
interpreting what Congress did in 1984.136 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has said that when deciding whether Congress intended to use the settled
meaning of a phrase, courts should look only to “the text or structure” of
the statute at issue—trying to find such an intent from examining other
statues is forbidden.137

132. United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985) (Farris, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1284.
134. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 26 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3209 (“[T]he
Committee has largely based section 3143 on a similar provision enacted in 1971 in the District of
Columbia Code.”). For a discussion by one of the members of the drafting team of the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (“D.C. Bail Act”), Pub. L.
No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.),
regarding the concerns about crime that led to D.C. bail reform and its effect on pre-trial detention
of defendants, see generally Frederick D. Hess, Pretrial Detention and the 1970 District of
Columbia Crime Act—The Next Step in Bail Reform, 37 BROOK. L. REV. 277 (1971). The 1966 Bail
Act governed bail pending appeal determinations in the District of Columbia before the passage
of the D.C. Bail Act. United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1972), abrogated
by Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
135. See United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1985) (alteration in original)
(quoting the D.C. Bail Act’s legislative history, H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 186–87 (1970)).
136. Cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“‘[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th
Cir. 1972))).
137. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 n.7 (1999) (“The Government argues that because
Congress has provided express materiality requirements in other statutes prohibiting fraudulent
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But even if the D.C. Bail Act’s legislative history were valuable in
determining congressional intent, it is not clear what “exceptional
circumstances” means in this context. Judge Farris treats as self-evidently
true the premise that it is not an “exceptional circumstance” when a
defendant can prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a
danger to the community, then prove that his direct appeal will raise a
fairly debatable issue, and finally prove that the fairly debatable issue, if
decided in his favor, would likely entitle him to a reversal or a new trial.138
Given that no standard in the history of bail pending appeal has required
so much of the defendant, it would be easy to interpret the current criteria
as requiring the defendant to prove he is entitled to bail because of
exceptional circumstances. But that historical perspective is entirely absent
from Judge Farris’s dissent.
Moreover, no court has interpreted the D.C. Bail Act to require the
defendant to prove that his direct appeal will raise a close question. Indeed,
no court has ever defined “substantial question” in the D.C. Bail Act,139
and D.C. superior court judges did not view the change from the old nonfrivolous issue standard to the new substantial question standard as
“effecting great change in the D.C. bail system.”140 Given this context,
citation to the ambiguous legislative history of the D.C. Bail Act
concerning “exceptional circumstances” cannot rebut the presumption that
Congress intended to use the settled definition of substantial question in
the 1984 Bail Act.

conduct, [Congress did not intend to incorporate the common-law definition of fraud]. . . . [T]hese
[other] statutes cannot rebut the presumption that Congress intended to incorporate the commonlaw meaning of the term ‘fraud’ in the mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes. That rebuttal
can only come from the text or structure of the fraud statutes themselves.”).
138. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
139. The few reported decisions applying the substantial question requirement never define
the term and instead just note that the appeal should be substantial. See, e.g., United States v. Jones,
476 F.2d 885, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing the “substantiality of the appeal” and noting that
judges should be “more receptive” to motions that raise a “substantial doubt” about the validity of
the conviction, but never providing a definition for what constitutes a substantial question). Soon
after the D.C. Bail Act was passed, the D.C. Circuit concluded that it did not apply to defendants
convicted in federal court of either a federal or local offense; instead, the 1966 Bail Act would
apply. United States v. Brown, 483 F.2d 1314, 1317–19 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (concluding that the D.C.
Bail Act did not apply to defendants convicted of local offenses—that is, D.C. Code offenses—in
federal court); United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (concluding that the
D.C. Bail Act did not apply to defendants convicted of federal offenses). In 1970, all D.C. local
felonies were tried in federal court, meaning the only class of defendants affected by the D.C. Bail
Act were those convicted of local misdemeanors. Brown, 483 F.2d at 1320 (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting). This fact might explain why there are so few cases discussing the D.C. Bail Act and
why “substantial question” has never been defined.
140. Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 56, at 935.
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2. The Prior Context in Which Substantial Question Was
Defined Is Irrelevant
Judge Farris also relied on another creative argument to support the
close question standard. He observed that when courts had previously
interpreted a substantial question to require the defendant to prove that his
appeal would raise a fairly debatable issue, courts were also supposed to
resolve all doubts in favor of granting bail.141 But according to Judge
Farris, the new presumption against bail meant that courts were no longer
supposed to resolve all doubts in favor of the defendant.142 Thus, it was
inappropriate to rely on the previous definition of substantial question
because it was formed under different and outdated assumptions.143
Judge Farris’s premises, however, do not support his conclusion. First,
the fact that Congress wanted to reverse the presumption in favor of bail
does not mean Congress wanted to reverse all parts of the law that favored
bail. During the era in which courts first started using the fairly debatable
standard, not only were all other doubts to be resolved in favor of bail, but
the defendant also carried the burden.144 Thus, it is not clear why Judge
Farris believes that when Congress placed the burden of the bail motion
on the defendant, it necessarily no longer wanted courts to resolve all
doubts in favor of bail. More fundamentally, even if the definition of
substantial question were created in a different bail environment, it does
not necessarily follow that Congress intended to change the historic
definition in the 1984 Bail Act.
3. Obtaining Bail Only When the Chance for Reversal Is “Substantial”
Is Consistent with the Fairly Debatable Standard
The only portion of the 1984 Bail Act’s legislative history that even
arguably discusses how to define substantial question notes that the new
standard for bail pending appeal “requires an affirmative finding that the

141. United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1284–85 (9th Cir. 1985) (Farris, J., dissenting).
The case commonly cited for this proposition is Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351
(Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955). See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir.
1979) (citing Herzog for the proposition that all doubts should be resolved in favor of granting
bail); United States v. Iacullo, 225 F.2d 458, 459 (7th Cir. 1955) (same).
142. Handy, 761 F.2d at 1284–85 (Farris, J., dissenting).
143. Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 793 F.2d 85, 91–92 (3d Cir. 1986) (Hunter, J.,
concurring) (same).
144. See, e.g., Herzog, 75 S. Ct. at 351 (requiring the defendant to prove his appeal would
raise a substantial question within the meaning of FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(2), but also resolving all
doubts in favor of bail).
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chance for reversal is substantial.”145 Some courts have quoted this phrase
in defense of the close question standard as self-evident support of that
standard.146
The statement, however, appears to be an unhelpful tautology—a
substantial question raised on appeal is an issue that gives the defendant
a substantial chance of obtaining a reversal. This phrase is hardly the type
of guidance courts can use to define substantial.147
This phrase is also hard to reconcile with the close question standard.
In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has said that
“‘probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity.’”148 To say a police officer has probable cause for a
search warrant is not to say the police officer believes it is a “close
question” whether he will find evidence of a crime; the Supreme Court has
never required such a strong showing.149
4. Looking at the Arguments in Favor of the Close Question Standard
in the Aggregate Does Not Support Use of the Standard
One could argue that even if none of these arguments individually is
convincing, taken together, the arguments evince Congress’s desire to
greatly restrict bail. And because the fairly debatable standard does not
145. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 27 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3210.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(“Congress passed the new law because it was unhappy with the old one. ‘The change . . . requires
an affirmative finding that the chance for reversal is substantial. This gives recognition to the basic
principle that a conviction is presumed to be correct.’” (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO.
98-225, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3210)).
147. This likely partially explains the fact that this piece of legislative history is typically not
mentioned when courts attempt to define substantial question. See, e.g., United States v. Bayko, 774
F.2d 516, 518 (1st Cir. 1985) (not mentioning the “substantial chance for reversal” portion of the
1984 Bail Act’s legislative history in adopting the close question standard); United States v.
Steinhorn, 927 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020,
1022–24 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 952 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d
898, 899 (11th Cir. 1985).
148. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243–44 n.13 (1983)).
149. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (noting that an officer has probable
cause that someone has committed a crime when the officer has a “reasonable ground for belief of
guilt”). On the other hand, the Supreme Court, when it interpreted a substantial question to require
a defendant to raise an issue that is “debatable among jurists of reason” (i.e., a fairly debatable
issue) in the habeas context, the Court was defining what constituted “probable cause” that the
defendant had a meritorious claim. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892–93 n.4 (1983),
superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (2000), as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473
(2000). By process of substitution then, the Court equated a fairly debatable issue with raising an
issue that has a substantial chance to succeed. Thus, it is entirely reasonable to equate having a
substantial chance of reversal to mean presenting a fairly debatable issue.
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greatly restrict bail, it is proper to resort to the close question standard.
This argument ignores, however, the gulf between the fairly debatable
standard and the earlier non-frivolous standard. When the law oscillated
between those two standards, courts hardly saw the difference as minor.
Indeed, Judge Holtzoff in 1950 praised the change from the non-frivolous
issue standard to the fairly debatable standard as fixing a “serious defect
in the administration of criminal justice.”150 When the standard was later
changed back to the non-frivolous issue standard, courts—and the
government—both agreed that the switch “greatly liberalized” the bail
pending appeal standard.151 The government even conceded that changing
the standard back from fairly debatable to non-frivolous would
significantly increase the number of defendants out on bail.152 Thus, it
would necessarily follow that simply replacing the non-frivolous issue
standard with the fairly debatable standard would greatly restrict bail
pending appeal and the number of defendants out on bail would
significantly decrease.
The perceived gap between the two standards, no doubt, was partly due
to the burden requirement flip-flopping—the government carried the
burden when the merit requirement was frivolous, and the defendant
carried the burden when it was a substantial question. As explained above,
placing the burden on the defendant to prove that he has a sufficiently
meritorious appeal to warrant bail can drastically decrease his chances of
obtaining bail.
The perceived gap also likely reflected an understanding that, in
practice, a significant divergence existed between the levels of merit
required to meet the two standards. While courts, at times, have
erroneously equated the merit required for a non-frivolous issue and a
substantial question,153 there is a distinction between the two. As the Ninth
Circuit stated in Handy: “‘The difference between the terms “not
frivolous” and “substantial” is perhaps one of art. Certainly it is subject to
subtle analysis. Nevertheless, the very fact that different words are used to
describe the standards . . . indicates that distinctions do exist.’”154
This argument also ignores the fact that Congress also placed other
important restrictions on bail pending appeal. One important restriction is
the demanding character requirement.155 Another important restriction is
the requirement that the defendant show not only that his appeal will raise

150. United States v. Burgman, 89 F. Supp. 288, 289 (D.D.C. 1950).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 49–51.
152. Id.
153. See Leibowitz, supra note 26, at 1096 (“Throughout the history of bail pending appeal,
courts have often confused the definition of ‘fairly debatable’ with ‘not frivolous.’”).
154. United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1282 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (alteration in original)
(quoting Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1977)).
155. See supra Part IV.A.1.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 1

856

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 60

a substantial question, but that the substantial question, if decided in his
favor, would “likely” result in a reversal or a new trial.156 This noharmless-error requirement is likewise unprecedented.
Finally, this argument cannot overcome the conclusion that Congress
expected courts to apply the settled definition of substantial question in
interpreting the 1984 Bail Act. Why would Congress expect courts to
interpret “substantial question” differently when the phrase had appeared
previously in the same exact standard? And if Congress did have such an
intention, why didn’t it say so somewhere—either in the statute itself by
providing another definition, or in the legislative history?
Courts should take Congress at its word. It was concerned about crime,
so it placed an unprecedented burden on defendants to prove that they are
not a danger to the community. And it wanted to reverse the presumption
in favor of bail that existed under prior law, so it placed the burden on the
defendant to prove he was entitled to bail and took the burden from the
government. But Congress did not intend to apply a radically stricter merit
requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
A powerful case supports the Ninth Circuit’s position that when
Congress in 1984 required defendants to prove that their direct appeal
would raise a “substantial question,” it intended defendants to establish
that their direct appeal would raise a fairly debatable issue. Nevertheless,
every other circuit except the Ninth Circuit (and arguably the Third
Circuit) has come to a different conclusion, creating a circuit split that has
lasted more than twenty years. Typically a split pitting the Ninth
Circuit—in a Judge Reinhardt decision—against the other circuits would
scream “cert worthy!” But even though the split has existed for some time,
and affects so many cases, the issue has evaded high court review.157 It is
time for the Supreme Court to step in and resolve the dispute. In the
meantime, some defendants will serve prison time only to have their
convictions overturned on appeal. The defendant will suffer unjustified
prison time—at taxpayer expense—to pay a debt to society that he did not
owe.

156. See supra Part III.
157. It is beyond the scope of this Article, but there is also a circuit split regarding the proper
standard of review for bail-pending-appeal motions. See United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810,
814 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the court would “independently review” the defendant’s bail
motion, although it would defer to the findings of the lower court); United States v. Londono-Villa,
898 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying a “clearly erroneous” standard of review); United States
v. Peden, 891 F.2d 514, 520 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying a “clearly erroneous” standard); United
States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that factual findings would be
reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions would be reviewed de novo); United States v.
Smegal, 772 F.2d 659, 661 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying a “clearly erroneous” standard).
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